The Morality of Litigation Part III – Enforcing the Principles

October 27th, 2010

MY CASE IN POINT

My recent blog posts have all referred to issues of pesticide poisoning in my own, personal experience and from reports of other incidents in the schools. I have posted about the adverse effects of these chemicals in the community at large when used lawfully and unlawfully. Most recently, I noted the absence of measures to detect and investigate it have become institutionalized in our country. Adverse effects of older use pesticides could be seen in lowered blood concentrations of particular enzymes and environmental sampling would reveal the particular agent responsible, if there was no documented application on record. Many in that class of chemicals (organophosphates) are currently banned for use in homes and schools although residues may persist and drift from legal applications in nearby farms or commercial properties can still lead to contamination. However, very few laboratories are set up to analyze samples collected from homes or schools in order to detect the newer pyrethroid pesticides, so widely used today. One lab tech informed me that there were no mandates as yet for running such tests and therefore few labs were re-tooling to conduct such analyses. Even more disturbing is the absence of medical laboratories to assess bodily tissues and fluids for absorbed pesticides because the CDC already detected them in the majority of Americans in their 2002 study of three thousand individuals.

In this age of terrorism which uses chemical nerve agents, it is ridiculous that we can’t even measure the presence/effects of nerve agents which are legally applied. That has led industry to make specious claims that the high frequency of usage of those products is, by itself, evidence that these products are ‘safe’. Claims of safety are illegal under FIFRA laws governing the use of pesticides. All that is demonstrated is that adverse effects are going undocumented. These inadequately researched chemicals on the market today are going to harm an entire generation before exposure data is finally mandated as per laws currently on the books.

As you will see from my own litigation experience, we can’t rely upon legal actions to protect society in general. Cases like my own which survive dismissal motions can languish for years in the dockets. There are no regulations which ensure timely prosecutions of cases and, as discussed in prior posts, trial is rarely on the horizon for any action. Discovery remains incomplete even in my own, eight year old case before the NYS Civil Supreme Court. For those of you who have asked to read the actual complaint as filed, you will see it in its entirety, under the cut below. This is the legalese which placed my injuries before the courts, although it may never see actual trial. While publicity surrounding the case reduces my chances of obtaining a settlement, I have made it clear that sealed settlements which hide the nature of injuries leading to court actions, are immoral because they don’t allow for precedents to be set that will protect others from similar hazards. If we can’t learn from these events, they are just another ‘day at the office’ for US citizens instead of a tool to assist in the evolution of society and in refining our use of dangerous technologies.

My injury in a school setting should never have happened. Repeated attempts have been made since 1990 to set legal guidelines for the kinds of toxic chemicals which can be used in schools, as well as the procedures for their safe application. Two decades later, these protections continue to be denied to staff and children despite widespread knowledge of acute and chronic illnesses which pesticides cause. The Senate has passed such measures twice in different versions of the School Environment Protection Act. However, this measure remains the hostage of the Committee on Agriculture in the House of Representatives where it has been refused a floor vote for over a decade.

I’ve always believed that reasonable adults can reach a consensus regarding any issue because we all have common interests. Bosses and workers need each other and so must work towards mutually advantageous business structures. Landlords, tenants and neighbors want peaceful living arrangements. Mature people recognize one another as independent agents working cooperatively towards mutually beneficial goals.

Partnerships are formed and agreements are made because goals are rarely reached in isolation. Success happens to be sweeter when attained by the maximum number of individuals within any group. That is what it takes to produce a product, develop a novel scientific discovery, or operate institutions such as those devoted to the education of children. Constitutional and legal provisions are a codification of common sense ways in which individuals intersect for the benefit of all. The courts are there when irrational impulses rule and benefit is sought at the expense of another.

I did my best to avoid conflicts in that school program by making advance arrangements to avoid the use of toxic substances in a setting which was mainly occupied by the most vulnerable of populations – very young children with disabilities. The courts will have the final say. In the absence of any rulings, let my example be sufficient warning to create new ways to keep our children and teachers safe in their schools.

Complaint:

STATE OF NEW YORK

SUPREME COURT QUEENS COUNTY

BARBARA RUBIN,

Plaintiff,

vs. VERIFIED COMPLAINT

MARATHON JEWISH COMMUNITY CENTER Index No. 14425/02

and PRO-TECH PEST CONTROL COMPANY INC.

Defendants


———————————————————-

Plaintiff by her attorneys, Allen & Lippes, as and for her complaint against

Defendants alleged the following on information and belief:

PARTIES

1.

Plaintiff Barbara Rubin, resides 529 East Chester Avenue, Long Beach, New York 11561.
2.

Defendant, Marathon Jewish Community Center (hereinafter, “MARATHON”) is a business existing pursuant to the laws of the State of New York and is located at 245-37 60th Avenue, Douglaston, New York 11362.
3.

Defendant Pro-Tech Pest Control Company, Inc, (hereinafter “PRO-TECH”) is a domestic corporation existing pursuant to the laws of the State of New York with its principle offices located at One Village Plaza, Kings Park, New York 11754.

BACKGROUND FACTS

4.

At all times relevant herein, Plaintiff Barbara Rubin suffers from, what the American Medical Association describes as “toxic effects of chemicals, non-medicinal,” which greatly affects her daily activities and has led to a substantial decrease in her quality of life.
5.

Plaintiff first began her relationship with the National Institute for People with Disabilities/New York League for Early Learning (hereinafter, “YAI/NYL”) when she interviewed for a pediatric speech and language supervisory position in the summer of 1995.
6.

At said interview, Plaintiff informed the panel interviewing her that she experienced significant reactions to a number of chemicals and fragrances and that if hired she would need some type of accommodation plan in order to effectively carry out the duties of her employment.
7.

Plaintiff was subsequently employed in October 1995 with an understanding that she had secured a verbal accommodation with her employers to alleviate any unnecessary exposure to chemicals substances to which she had negative reactions.
8.

One such accommodation that was provided to Plaintiff was that the pest exterminator hired by YAI/HYL would be contacted, and the spraying of pesticides would be arranged each Friday afternoon after 3:00 p.m. Thereby allowing Plaintiff to avoid unnecessary exposure to sensitive chemicals.
9.

Although there was the occasional unavoidable accident regarding Plaintiff’s contact with substances to which she was sensitive, the Plaintiff was able to work efficiently for about a year before any major incidents took place, receiving accolades from her employer regarding her work.
10.

On or about a year after Plaintiff’s hire, the exterminators arrived on a Thursday evening and sprayed for pests, contrary to her accommodation plan. When the Plaintiff reported to work the following morning, she immediately fell ill, experienced labored breathing and was on the verge of fainting. It was later determined that the exterminator had arrived the night before and sprayed a substance, Dursban, which is a chemical known by the Plaintiff to cause her significant negative medical reactions.
11.

After the aforementioned incident occurred, accommodations were again made with the exterminating company to provide prior notice of any spraying and to allow for adequate ventilation after any spraying incident.
12.

During her second year of employment, Plaintiff began to develop asthma to do unknown exposure to chemicals which Plaintiff believes was the result of residual extermination chemicals and/or continued use of said chemicals.
13.

In the beginning of 1998, a water-main break occurred outside the Gramercy School, where the Plaintiff was currently employed. Said water-main break resulted in numerous floods to area buildings including the Gramercy School. The boilers and furnace of said school were flooded as a result of the water-main break and numerous individuals, including the Plaintiff, experienced pronounced odors of petroleum throughout the building as a result of the flooded boiler and furnace.
14.

Upon her exposure to the petroleum odors, Plaintiff, as well as other individual in the building, became ill on site. However, due to the Plaintiff’s heightened sensitivity to chemicals, her illness was much more severe than the other employees. As a result, Plaintiff was temporarily transferred to another set of offices across town. During said period of relocation, Plaintiff felt much better when she was away from the Gramercy School than when she was at that site.
15.

Numerous complaints were made by several employees to the director of the preschool program requesting that testing be performed in the building to determine the adequacy of the indoor air quality.
16.

A month after the aforementioned water-main break, Plaintiff was contacted by the director of YAI/NYL and was told that the Gramercy School had undergone indoor air testing and that it, the school, had a major ventilation problem. The director further represented that as a result of the deficient indoor air quality, anyone with respiratory problems would be negatively affected, including the Plaintiff and the director himself.
17.

Plaintiff persevered despite the incident and continued to efficiently attend to her duties at the Gramercy School, albeit at a significantly reduced rate, ie two hours per day. In addition to the performance of her duties at the Gramercy School, Plaintiff continued to work out of the YAI/NYL Manhattan office.
18.

Soon, however, the Plaintiff began to again become ill as soon as she would enter the Gramercy School due to the school coordinator’s decision to use perfume deodorizers in all of the bathrooms and perfume cleaners on every floor. Although Plaintiff attempted to inform the coordinator that said perfumes and odors were making her extremely ill, these substances were continued in use in violation of the accommodation plan.
19.

After one particularly bad day in April of 1998, wherein Plaintiff collapsed at the Gramercy School, Plaintiff refused to ever enter the building again. This decision was made despite the numerous attempts by the Plaintiff to work with her employer to provide her a toxin free environment.
20.

After Plaintiff expressed her concerns to the YAI/NYL executive director, she was later transferred to the Douglaston School in Queens, New York in or about July of 1998. Said school was leased by YAI/NYL from the building’s owner, Defendant Marathon.
21.

Plaintiff was informed by her employer that with her new supervisory position at said school, she would be able to substantially control the environmental conditions which surrounded her and thus reduce her chances to be exposed to chemicals which made her extremely ill.
22.

Plaintiff was told to contact Defendant Marathon directly to secure a suitable environment not only for the Plaintiff’ but also for the individual students who attended the school and who also suffered from various respiratory conditions.
23.

In accordance with her employer’s recommendations, Plaintiff contacted Josephine Fabre, the office manager at Defendant Marathon Jewish Community Center. Plaintiff informed Ms. Fabre of her sensitivity to certain chemicals and perfumes and requested that reasonable measures be taken to reduce the chances of exposure to said chemicals which caused extreme negative reactions in the Plaintiff. Ms. Fabre, as a representative of the Defendant Marathon, agreed to assist Plaintiff in anyway possible. Plaintiff was told by the Defendant Marathon’s representative, that the Defendant Pro-Tech would be informed of the accommodation given to the Plaintiff. Moreover, Rhonda Kontner, a member of the board of the directors fo the Defendant was made aware of the accommodation needed by the Plaintiff.
24.

Plaintiff and Mrs. Fabre, the representative of Defendant Marathon, also spoke directly to a representative of Defendant Pro-Tech regarding necessary accommodations needed for spraying. Plaintiff informed Defendant Pro-Tech that the need for advance warning of any spraying was due to Plaintiff’s extreme reaction to the types of chemicals commonly used by exterminating companies.
25.

Although Plaintiff received these guarantees, she still watned to have her previous verbal accommodations with YAI/NYL reduced to writing to ensure any mishaps such as those which occurred at Gramercy School, were avoided at the Douglaston School.
26.

Plaintiff finally received her written accommodation plan ten months after her hire at the Douglaston School.
27.

Plaintiff Barbara Rubin, during her first year at Douglaston School effectuated her own environmental control over the areas to which she was supervisor by removing perfume and other chemicals which cause adverse reactions not only hin her, but also in dindivudal students who suffered from various respiratory problems.
28.

In or about June of 1999, Plaintiff was informed by Ms. Fabre that the Defendant Mrathon wanted the entire building sprayed for pests. This advance notice demonstrated to Plaintiff that the Defendant Marathon was aware of her sensitivities and was willing to accommodate the Plaintiff by providing her advance notice of any exterminations.
29.

When Plaintiff returned to work in the beginning of July 1999, she began to react to undetermined conditions present at the Defendant Marathon’s building. Plaintiff began to experience periods of dizziness, headaches, nausea, cramps, chest tightening, weakness, fatigue, tremors, occasional numbness on her right side and the onset of neurological problems. Beginning from this time forth, Plaintiff was never again well at the Douglaston building. These symptoms increased in their severity over the next several months.
30.

In or about August of 1999, Plaintiff saw an environmental allergist who informed her that her reactions were now becoming neurological in nature. Due to these increased reactions, Plaintiff was prescribed oxygen to reduce the severity of the reactions.
31.

Although the prescribed oxygen was helpful for the Plaintiff to continue her duties at the Defendant Marathon’s building, Plaintiff was experiencing the continued chronic discomfort mentioned above in severity which would was and wane from week to week.
32.

Plaintiff began to suspect that her reactions were either a result of neurological disease or that certain pesticides might be in use at the Defendant Marathon’s building in violation of the written accommodation plan she had with her employer and despite the knowledge of the Defendant Marathon of Plaintiff’s medical reactions and agreement to accommodate her.
33.

Plaintiff experienced symptoms everyday, including but not limited to poor concentration, fatigue, clumsiness, loss of appetite, headaches, nausea, and fiber myalgia (chronic pain generalized). Plaintiff’s short term memory was less reliable than before and Plaintiff’s short term memory loss appeared to be escalating in severity.
34.

Plaintiff’s supervisor, B. Kestenbaum, YAI/NYL, instructed her to do research to determine a landlord’s obligations to disclose applications of chemicals to tenants, and permitted her to interview companies who performed pest control utilizing non-toxic means. When Plaintiff interviewed said companies, the supervisor of the Douglaston School, B. Kestenbaum, was present during a few of these interviews of the companies.
35.

In or about December of 1999, Plaintiff requested the labels of any pesticides used in the building from the Defendant Marathon in order to ascertain whether there was any current use of pesticides.
36.

Plaintiff learned that the spraying of pesticides at the Defendant Marathon School was occurring twice monthly using chemicals such as Demon and Demand (Cypermethrin and Lamda-Cyhalothrin).
37.

Plaintiff received along with the pesticide labels, a letter setting forth the schedule of the spraying. She forwarded the same onto Ms. Fabre, a representative of the Defendant Marathon, and placed a call to the party in-charge of establishing building maintenance policies.
38.

The party in-charge of establishing building maintenance policies, a representative of the Defendant Marathon, informed the Plaintiff that despite the Defendant’s knowledge that the Plaintiff suffered from extreme negative reactions to the pesticides in use, the Defendant would continue to use the products of their choice.
39.

Plaintiff pleased with said representative to, at a very minimum, notify her in advance of said spraying in accordance with the guarantees provided by Ms. Fabre back in 1998. However, Plaintiff received no assurances from the Defendant’s representative they they would, in the future, provide her any notice of any spraying by any company hired by the Defendant.
40.

Upon returning to the Defendant Marathon’s facility after Christmas vacation in 1999, Plaintiff again became very ill. On the basis of the odors present, Plaintiff arrived at the conclusion that pesticides were again sprayed at the Defendant Marathon’s facility.
41.

Plaintiff asked her employer at YAI/NYL to intervene on her behalf. Plaintiff stated that she would not return to work at the Defendant’s facility until the spraying stopped or the Plaintiff was given advance notice as per her accommodation plan guarantees.
42.

Plaintiff was assured by YAI/NUYL that the spraying would cease and that she would get advance warnings prior to any future spraying.
43.

The Plaintiff then contacted Neil Gershwin of Defendant Marathon, and was advised to speak with the pest control company owner, Stuart Bogard, to again ensure that Plaintiff would at least receive advance notice of any use of pesticide at the facility.
44.

Plaintiff contacted Defendant Pro-Tech and spoke to Mr. Bogard. He informed Plaintiff that no spraying go any type had ever occurred at the Defendant Marathon’s premises and that only gel baits were used. These representations were made by the Defendant Pro-Tech despite the Plaintiff being provided the previously referenced information sheets regarding pesticide use at the facility.
45.

Subsequently , despite Defendant Pro-Tech’s denials, Defendant Marathon told the Plaintiff that they, the Defendant Marathon, discharged the Defendant Pro-Tech. Moreover, the Defendant Marathon represented that it would not hire a new pesticide control company even if said company would use non-toxic pest control means.
46.

In or about March of 2000, because Plaintiff’s health symptoms remained, Plaintiff contacted a toxicologist who sent the Plaintiff a sampling kit with precise instructions for taking four swipes from areas that Plaintiff thought were treated by pesticides. Plaintiff took said samples and sent them off to the toxicologist lab in Virginia for analysis. The tests came back positive for both pesticides Demon and Demand, in various quantities.
47.

In or about May, 2000 due to the continuous symptoms suffered by the Plaintiff and based on the assumption that pesticides were continuing to be used, she was evaluated by her physician and it was determined that she was suffering from loss of brain cells. Further testing was recommended.
48.

In or about June 2000, YAI/NYL determined that the Douglaston School was no longer profitable and the decision was made to close said school.
49.

Plaintiff was thereafter transferred to another of her employer’s facilities but Plaintiff had already suffered, to her detriment, debilitating reactions to numerous chemicals known to Plaintiff and to chemicals which the Plaintiff had not previously reacted to.
50.

In or about August, 2000, Plaintiff underwent extensive psychological/neurological testing to quantify the extent of the deficiency suffered.
51.

In or about February of 2001, Plaintiff received a diagnosis from her doctor, regarding the August, 2000 visit, to wit said the doctor determined that she was now suffering from a debilitating organic brain dysfunction consistent with neurotoxicity of recent origin.
52.

Plaintiff has now had to terminate her employment and can no longer engage in activities which are enjoyed by the average individual. For instance, Plaintiff has stopped going to most places outside of work and home such as museums, restaurants and the like.

AS AND FOR A CAUSE OF ACTION DEFENDANT MARATHON

NEGLIGENCE

53.

Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges paragraphs 1 though 52 of this complaint as if more fully set forth herein at length.
54.

Upon Plaintiff’s assignment to its facility, Defendant Marathon knew or should have known that the Plaintiff suffered from a disorder which causes her to be extremely sensitive to various chemical substances.
55.

Defendant Marathon by and through its representative, agreed that every reasonable step would be taken to reduce the possibility of exposure by the Plaintiff to chemical substances resulting in extreme medical reactions. Defendant therefore owed a duty to the Plaintiff to inform her when certain pesticides, which are known to be toxic in nature, were sprayed at the Defendant Marathon’s facility, thereby allowing Plaintiff ample opportunity to take the necessary steps to avoid exposure and safeguard her health.
56.

Despite the knowledge of the Plaintiff’s sensitivities, Defendant Marathon refused to accommodate Plaintiff disability and allowed the Defendant Pro-Tech, over whom it had control, to spray the Defendant’s facility. Defendant Marathon allowed such spraying with the careless disregard for the effects that would have on the Plaintiff, as well as possible effects it may have had on individual students who suffered from respiratory dysfunctions.
57.

By allowing the Defendant Pro-Tech to spray its facility without due notice given to Plaintiff, Defendant has caused Plaintiff to suffer numerous injuries, including but not limited to, neuropsychological disorders, exacerbation of respiratory dysfunction, cognitive deficiency (speech/language impairment), sensory/motor dysfunction, organic brain dysfunction, general physical debilitation, and the like.
58.

Due to the Defendant Marathon’s actions, Plaintiff is unable to enjoy the simply pleasures of life and is now experiencing an increased sensitivity to additional chemicals which she had not previously experienced. The Defendant Marathon’s acts were done with carelessness, recklessness and wantonness to the known condition of the Plaintiff.
59.

Due to the careless, reckless and wanton nature of the Defendant’s activities, Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages.
60.

Plaintiff in no way contribute to her injuries.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment as more fully set for in the ad damnum clause of this complaint.

AS AND FOR A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT PRO-TECH

NEGLIGENCE

61.

Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges paragraphs 1 though 60 of this complaint as if more fully set forth herein at length.
62.

Plaintiff informed Defendant Pro-Tech through its agents and through the Defendant Marathon, that the Plaintiff experienced a heightened sensitivity to the pesticides generally used by the Defendant Pro-Tech to exterminate a facility of pests.
63.

The Defendant Pro-Tech knew or should have known that utilizing such pesticides would in fact cause Plaintiff to fall ill and suffer immense discomfort in her daily life. Based on this knowledge, the Defendant Pro-Tech owed a duty to ensure that its activities were not harmful to the Plaintiff and other individuals, and that Plaintiff would be advised prior to any spraying taking place at the Defendant Marathon’s facility.
64.

Despite the duty owed to the Plaintiff to warn her prior to the use of toxic chemicals such as Demon and Demand, Defendant Pro-Tech negligently sprayed the Defendant Marathon’s facility in contradiction of the rights and well-being of the Plaintiff. As a proximate and direct result of the Defendant’s negligent conduct, the Plaintiff suffers numerous injures, including but not limited to, neuropsychological disorders, exacerbation of respiratory dysfunction, cognitive deficiency (speech /language impairment), sensory/motor dysfunction, organic brain dysfunction, general physical debilitation, and the like.
65.

The Defendant actions of spraying toxic chemicals knowing the harmful affect that it would have on the Plaintiff was careless, reckless and wanton.
66.

Based on the careless, reckless and wanton activities of the Defendant Pro-Tech, the Plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages.
67.

The Plaintiff in no way contributed to her known damages.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment as more fully set forth in the ad damnum clause of this complaint.

AS AND FOR A CAUSE OF ACTION DEFENDANT MARATHON

FAILURE TO WARN

68.

Plaintiff repeated and re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 67 of this complaint as if more fully set forth herein at lengthy.
69.

Defendant Marathon has a duty to use reasonable care to provide reasonable accommodations for persons with disabilities such as the Plaintiff and thus provide safe working environment. Allowing Defendant Pro-Tech to spray pesticides, despite Plaintiff’s known propensity to negative reactions of these chemicals, Defendant Marathon has created an unreasonably unsafe condition for the Plaintiff in her employment.
70.

Due to the knowledge of the Defendant Marathon of Plaintiff’s sensitivities, Defendant Marathon had a duty to warn Plaintiff when said chemicals, to which she suffered negative reactions, were being utilized on the premises.
71.

The Defendant Marathon’s breach of its duty to warn Plaintiff of the use of substances who which negative reactions would result, was the proximate and direct result of the Plaintiff’s injuries.
72.

The defendant Marathon’s Failure to warn the Plaintiff resulted in Plaintiff suffering from numerous injuries including but not limited to, neuropsychological disorders, ecexacerbationf respiratory dysfunction, cognitive deficiency (speech /language impairment), sensory/motor dysfunction, organic brain dysfunction, general physical debilitation, and the like.
73.

By reason of the foregoing, Plaintiff has been damaged by the Defendant Marathon and requests relief as more fuly set forth in the ad damnum clause of this complaint.

AS AND FOR A CAUSE OF ACTION DEFENDANT PRO-TECH

FAILURE TO WARN

74.

Plaintiff repeated and re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 73 of this complaint as if more fully set forth herein at length.
75.

Defendant Pro-Tech has a duty to use reasonable care to provide reasonable accommodations for persons with disabilities such as the Plaintiff and thus provide a safe working environment when it has knowledge of the negative affects of their activities.
76.

Defendant Pro-Tech’s activities of spraying pesticides despite Plaintifff’s known propensity twards negative reactions to these chemicals, has created an unreasonably unsafe condition for the Plaintiff in her employment.
77.

Due to the knowledge of the Defendant Pro-Tech of Plaintiff’s sensitivities, Defendant Pro-Tech had a duty to warn Plaintiff when chemicals to which she suffered negative reactions were being utilized on the premises.
78.

The Defendant Pro-Tech’s breach of its duty to warn Plaintiff of the use of substances to which negative reactions would result, was the proximate and direct result of the Plaintiff’s injuries.
79.

As a result, Plaintiff suffers from numerous injuries including but not limited to, neuropsychological disorders, exacerbation of respiratory dysfunction, cognitive deficiency (speech /language impairment), sensory/motor dysfunction, organic brain dysfunction, general physical debilitation, and the like.
80.

By reason of the foregoing, Plaintiff has been damaged by the Defendant Pro-Tech and requests relief as more fully set forth in the ad damnum clause of this complaint.

AS AND FOR A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT PRO-TECH

BATTERY

81.

Plaintiff repeated and re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 80 of this complaint as if more fully set forth herein at length.
82.

Defendant Pro-Tech sprayed pesticides in the Defendant Marathon’s building with utter disregard to the harmful and offensive bodily contact it would cause the Plaintiff and said contact was done without the Plaintiff’s consent.

83.

Defendant Pro-Tech sprayed the pesticides in a manner which was voluntary and with the knowledge that its acts, under the circumstances known to it or should have been known to it, made it substantially likely that the result of which Plaintiff would suffer from adverse medical reactions.
84.

As a result of the Defendant Pro-Tech’s activities, Plaintiff suffers from numerous injuries including but not limited to, neuropsychological disorders, exacerbation of respiratory dysfunction, cognitive deficiency (speech /language impairment), sensory/motor dysfunction, organic brain dysfunction, general physical debilitation, and the like.
85.

By reason of the foregoing, Plaintiff has been damaged by the Defendant Pro-Tech and requests relief as more fully set forth in the ad damnum clause of this complaint.

AD DAMNUM CLAUSE

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Barbara Rubin demands judgment against each Defendant for each cause of action in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND ($500,000.00) DOLLARS,

FURTHERMORE, Plaintiff demands punitive damages from each Defendant in the amount of ONE MILLION ($1,000,000.00) DOLLARS each, and

FURTHERMORE, Plaintiff demands interests plus the costs and disbursement of this action together with such other and further relief as the court may deem just and proper

DATED: Buffalo, New York

May 16, 2002

CHRISTOPHER M. DUGGAN, ESQ, Of Counsel

Allen & Lippes

1260 Delaware Avenue

Buffalo, New York 14209-2498

Telephone: (716) 884-4800

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Verification was made and notarized by the Plaintiff on May 9, 2002

==================================

Update on case here in part IV

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